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Do “Off-Site” Adult Businesses Have Secondary Effects? 
Legal Doctrine, Social Theory, and Empirical Evidence* 
 
Richard McCleary                    Alan C. Weinstein 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Recent federal court decisions appear to limit the ability of cities to mitigate the ambient 
crime risks associated with adult entertainment busines es.  In one instance, a court has assumed 
that criminological theories do not apply to “off-site” adult businesses.  After developing the 
legal doctrine of secondary effects, we demonstrate hat the prevailing criminological theory 
applies to all adult business models.  To corroborate the theory, we report the results of a 
before/after quasi-experiment for an off-site adult b siness.  When an off-site adult business 
opens, ambient crime risk doubles compared to a control area.  As theory predicts, moreover, 
ambient victimization risk is most acute in night-time hours.  The theoretical development and 
empirical results have obvious implications for theevolving legal doctrine of secondary effects. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Can a government, through zoning and licensing, regulate stores that sell sexually explicit 
material strictly for off-site use?  As a matter of law, expressive activities that occur inside adult 
businesses enjoy a degree of First Amendment protecti n.1 The U.S. Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts have ruled, nevertheless, that governments may regulate adult businesses so 
long as the regulations are aimed at mitigating the businesses’ potential adverse “secondary 
effects,” such as ambient noise, blight, and in particular, crime.2 
 
To enact an adult business ordinance, a government ust collect evidence to show that 
the businesses are associated with negative secondary effects.  Many of the studies conducted by 
governments over the last three decades find that adul businesses do have significant secondary 
effects.  Most of these studies assume that different types of adult businesses – cabarets, 
bookstores, arcades, etc. – have identical secondary effects, however.  Whether warranted or not, 
this assumption has become legally problematic. 
 
To illustrate the problem, suppose that each type of adult business has a unique “average” 
secondary effect.  This implies that one of these diff rent types would have the lowest effect of 
any adult business.  The secondary effects of this type of business might conceivably be 
sufficiently de minimus as to fall below the Constitutional threshold where a government could 
regulate its operation.  Alternatively, if the effect falls just above the threshold, the method of 
operation of that type of business might be “tweaked” to force its secondary effects below the 
threshold. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
* Correspondence to mccleary@uci.edu or alan.weinstein@law.csuohio.edu.  An earlier version 
of this paper was read at a panel of the American Society for Criminology, November 14th, 2007, 
Atlanta, GA.  Marcus Felson, James W. Meeker, Wendy Regoeczi and anonymous referees 
commented on early drafts. 
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  What might this “bullet-proof” type of adult business look like?  Common sense 
suggests that it would be a store that sells adult merchandise for off-site use.3 The typical 
customer drives to the store; parks; goes in;  makes  purchase; comes  out; and drives away.  
Except for the merchandise purchased, this routine activity is indistinguishable from the routine 
activities of convenience stores, dry cleaners, and libraries.  Common sense argues then, that the 
secondary effects associated with off-site adult businesses are likely to be no larger than the 
analogous effects associated with convenience stores, d y cleaners, and libraries. 
 
Adult book and video stores have made this common sense argument and some courts 
have found it persuasive.  Like many common sense arguments, this one ignores theoretically 
relevant differences between adult and non-adult businesses.  In fact, the routine activity theory 
of crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson and Cohen, 1980; Sherman, Gartin, and Buergner, 
1989) predicts that virtually all types of adult businesses will have large, significant crime-
related secondary effects.  The case study results reported here corroborate the theory for stores 
that sell adult merchandise strictly for off-site use.  Before presenting the theory and evidence, 
we outline the evolution of the laws that Andrew (2000) calls the “secondary effects doctrine.” 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE  
 
Although the court decisions that motivate this essay were published in 2002 and 2003, 
both rest on an evolving body of law that begins thirty years earlier.  In the late 1960s, Boston’s 
city planners proposed to concentrate the city’s adult businesses in a single small district.  This 
proposal had two theoretical advantages.  First, it would keep vice activity out of the city’s other 
districts.  Second, it would allow the police to focus resources on a small area, thereby reducing 
the risk of crimes associated with vice. 
 
By the early 1970s, the failure of Boston’s “combat zone” experiment was obvious 
(Skogan, 1992; Garnett, 2005).  At about this time, D troit consulted with social scientists and 
real estate experts on the question of whether adult businesses should be allowed to locate near 
other adult businesses.  The experts agreed that dispers ng adult businesses would mitigate their 
secondary effects.  Relying on the experts’ opinions, Detroit enacted an ordinance that set 
minimum distances between adult business sites. (American Mini-Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs 1975  
at 1018).   Forced to relocate, several existing adult businesses challenged the Constitutionality 
of the Detroit ordinance.  Borrowing from the vocabulary of antitrust cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in Young v. American Mini-Theatres (1976) that governments could enact adult 
business ordinances so long as the ordinances were aimed at mitigating adverse secondary 
effects.  By this test, the Court upheld the Detroit ordinance. 
 
Although Young (1976) required that regulations be based on secondary effects evidence, 
it said nothing about the quantity or quality of the evidence.  These questions were addressed ten 
years later in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986). In the early 1980s, Renton, 
Washington enacted a zoning ordinance that in many respects resembled the ordinance 
challenged in Young.  Since Renton had no adult businesses, it could not base its ordinance on 
local studies and so looked to a Washington Supreme Court opinion reviewing studies from 
nearby Seattle. (Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle 1978). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010335
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A year later, two theaters located in a prohibited district began to show x-rated films.  In 
the ensuing challenge, the Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance complied with the Young 
(1976) standard in that its sole purpose was the mitigation of secondary effects.  Further, the 
Court explicitly stated that a city need not conduct its own study of secondary effects or produce 
evidence of secondary effects in addition to that already available from other cities before 
enacting an ordinance regulating adult businesses, o long as the city believed that whatever 
studies or evidence it relied on were relevant to the problem the city was addressing. (Renton 
1986 at 51-52).  Renton (1986) thus legitimized the practice of basing a local ordinance on 
secondary effects studies from other communities.  Renton (1986) also set a reliability threshold, 
albeit a low one, for the government’s secondary effects evidence.  The evidence must be 
“reasonably believed to be relevant.” (Renton 1986 at 51-52). 
 
The Supreme Court revisited this issue sixteen years later in its decision in City of Los 
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (2002).  In 1977, Los Angeles had conducted a comprehensive 
secondary effects study that found, among other things, that concentrations of adult businesses 
were associated with high ambient crime rates.  Based on this finding, Los Angeles enacted an 
ordinance requiring adult businesses to be separated by a minimum distance.  The ordinance was 
amended in 1983 to prevent businesses from evading the minimum distance rule by merging into 
a single entity.  Instead of requiring minimum distances between adult businesses, the amended 
ordinance required minimum distances between distinct adult entertainment activities.  Adult 
businesses that combined on-site coin-operated video viewing booths with sales of videos for 
off-site use were prohibited.4 These multiple-activity businesses were forced to segregate their 
on-site and off-site activities. 
 
In 1995, two multiple-activity businesses challenged the amended ordinance.  Since the 
1977 study said nothing about the secondary effects of combining multiple activities under one 
roof, they argued that Los Angeles had no evidence that multiple-activity businesses were 
associated with secondary effects.  The federal District Court agreed and the 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed on the ground that because the 1977 Los Angeles study had not investigated 
the effects of multiple-activities under one roof, the evidence for the amended ordinance did not 
meet Renton’s threshold of being reasonably relevant. (Alameda Books v. City of Los Angeles 
2000).  But the U.S. Supreme Court took a different view. 
 
As often happens in First Amendment cases, the Supreme Court’s decision did not 
produce a clear majority holding.  Because the 1977 Los Angeles study had not investigated the 
effects of multiple-activities under one roof, the 9th Circuit found that the evidence for the 
amended ordinance did not meet the Renton (1986) threshold. (Alameda Books 2000 at 727-28). 
 
While acknowledging the limitations of the 1977 study, Justice O’Connor argued that Los 
Angeles could infer from its study that concentrations of adult activities would also be associated 
with secondary effects and, thus, that Los Angeles had complied with the evidentiary 
requirement of Renton (1986).5 Justice O’Connor then addressed what evidentiary st ndard a 
city would need to meet. After noting that in Renton (1986) the Court “held that a municipality 
may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably believd to be relevant’ for demonstrating a 
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connection between speech and a substantial indepennt government interest,” Justice 
O’Connor wrote: 
 
This is not to say that a municipality can get away ith shoddy data or reasoning.  
The municipality's evidence must fairly support themunicipality's rationale for its 
ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by 
demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by 
furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings, the 
municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in casting 
doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to the 
municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory 
that justifies its ordinance. (City of Los Angeles 2002 at 438-39). 
 
Applying this test to the case at hand, Justice O’Connor concluded that, given the early stage of 
the litigation, the city had complied with the evidentiary requirement of Renton (1986). 
 
Justice Kennedy wrote a lengthy concurring opinion to express concern that “the 
plurality's application of Renton (1986) might constitute a subtle expansion” of what is permitted 
under that case. (City of Los Angeles 2002 at 425).6 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter, 
joined in part by Justice Breyer, argued that imposing tricter evidentiary standards on 
governments would guard against potential abuses and c lled for the Court to impose on 
government a requirement that it demonstrate empirically “that the [negative secondary] effects 
exist, that they are caused by the expressive activity subject to the zoning, and that the zoning 
can be expected either to ameliorate them or to enhance the capacity of the government to 
combat them (say, by concentrating them in one area), without suppressing the expressive 
activity itself.” (City of Los Angeles 2002 at 452-53).7 In the final section of his dissent, which 
Justice Breyer did not join, Justice Souter applied this standard to the case at hand and argued 
that the city offered neither a rationale nor evidence to support the proposition that an adult 
bookstore combined with video booths would produce the claimed secondary effects. (City of 
Los Angeles 2002 at 461-64). 
 
In the wake of Alameda Books (2002), adult businesses began to use the approach spelled 
out by the plurality to challenge ordinances.  With one exception, most of these challenges have 
failed.  If a regulation has a plausible rationale nd if it is supported by at least some evidence, 
the courts continue to show substantial deference to l gislatures. See, e.g., (G.M.Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Town of  St. Joseph, WI 2003; Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox 2005; Abilene Retail #30, Inc. 
v. Board of Commissioners of Dickinson Cty. 2005).8 
 
Challenges to government regulations of off-site adult businesses are an exception to this 
rule.  In Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antoni (2003), an ordinance classified off-site book 
and video stores as adult entertainment businesses if their inventories included 20 percent adult 
material.  Citing Alameda Books (2002), an off-site book store challenged the ordinance’s 
rationale and underlying evidence.  Agreeing, the 5th Circuit found that San Antonio had relied 
on studies that either excluded off-site adult busine ses or, otherwise, had not distinguished 
between the effects of on-site and off-site adult bsinesses.  In the Court's view, moreover, the 
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city’s rationale for ignoring the differences between on-site and off-site businesses was weak. 
 
Off-site businesses differ from on-site ones, because it is only reasonable to 
assume that the former are less likely to create harmful secondary effects because 
of the fact that consumers of pornography are not as likely to linger in the area 
and engage in public alcohol consumption and other undesirable activities. 
(Encore Videos at 294-95). 
 
Other factors influenced the decision, of course, and  recent 5th Circuit decision, to be discussed 
shortly, clarifies Encore Videos (2003).  For present purposes, however, we end with the Court’s 
theory.  While the theory is compelling from a commonsense perspective, it ignores theoretically 
relevant characteristics of off-site adult businesses. 
 
THE ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY OF CRIME HOT SPOTS  
 
The prevailing criminological theory of secondary effects is derived from a special case 
of the routine activity theory of crime (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson and Cohen, 1980; 
Clarke, 1983; Felson, 1998).  Applied to secondary effects, the theory holds that the routine 
activity at adult business sites attracts predators, generating a “hotspot of predatory crime” 
(Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981, 1993). 
 
Applied to crime hotspots, the routine activity theory assumes that a pool of f enders 
moves freely from site to site, stopping to prey when a relatively attractive site is discovered.  
The relative attractiveness of a site is proportional to the number of targets, weighted by their 
value, and inversely proportional to the level of police presence at the site.  Sites with relatively 
many high-value targets and relatively low police pr sence attract relatively many predators. 
 
Limiting the routine activity theory to crime hot spots allows for two simplifications of 
the original general theory of Cohen and Felson (1979;  Felson and Cohen, 1980).  First, the 
original theory’s more general “capable guardians” factor can be reduced to police presence at 
the site.  Second, the original theory’s more general “suitability” factor, which determines the 
relative risk of a target, can be reduced to the value, in the predator’s estimation, of the targets at 
a site.  Both simplifications reflect the characteristics of the expected offenders. 
 
The offenders who are attracted to adult business site  lack legitimate means of livelihood 
and devote substantial time to illegitimate activities.  By Sutherland’s (1937) definition, they are 
“professional thieves.”  Otherwise, they are a heterog neous group.  Some are vice purveyors 
who dabble in crime; others are criminals who use the promise of vice to lure and lull their 
victims.  Despite their heterogeneity, these predators share a rational decision-making calculus 
that draws them to adult business sites. 
 
The connection between vice and predatory crime has been a popular plot device for at 
least 250 years.  John Gay’s (1728) Beggar’s Opera, for example, centers on the relationship 
between MacHeath, a predatory criminal, and the vicring composed of Peachum, Lucy, and 
Jenny.  This popular view is reinforced by the empirical literature on criminal lifestyles and 
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thought processes.  The earliest and best-known study (Shaw, 1930; Snodgrass, 1982) describes 
“Stanley,” a delinquent who lives with a prostitute and preys on her clients. 
 
Criminological thinking on the connection between vice and predatory crime has changed 
little in the 75 years since Shaw’s Jack-Roller (Felson, 2006; Potter, 1989).  To document the 
rational choices of predatory criminals, Wright and Decker (1997) interviewed 86 active armed 
robbers.  Asked to describe a perfect victim, all mentioned victims involved in vice, either as 
sellers or buyers.  Three of the armed robbers worked as prostitutes: 
 
From their perspective, the ideal robbery target was a married man in search of an 
illicit sexual adventure; he would be disinclined to make a police report for fear of 
exposing his own deviance (p. 69). 
 
The rational calculus described by these prostitute-robbers echoes the descriptions of other 
predators (see, e.g., Bennett and Wright, 1984;  Feeney, 1986; Fleisher, 1995; Katz, 1988, 1991;  
Shover, 1998). 
 
Like tourist attractions (Dimanche and Lepetic, 1999; Danner, 2003) and sporting events 
(Corcoran, Wilson and Ware, 2003;  Westcott, 2006), adult business sites attract targets from 
wide catchment areas.  Compared to the targets attracted to these other hotspots, however, adult 
business patrons are disproportionately male, open to vice overtures, and carry cash.  When 
victimized, moreover, adult business patrons are reluctant to involve the police.  They are 
“perfect” victims, from the rational predator’s perspective. 
 
Given a choice among equally lucrative sites, predators prefer sites with low levels of 
police presence (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995).  In the original statement of the routine activity 
theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson and Cohen, 1980), the pool of “capable guardians” 
included not only the police but, also, the targets themselves and any potential witnesses.  Given 
the stigma associated with adult businesses, however, customers may be reluctant to have their 
presence at the site documented in police records.  The level of guardianship at an adult business 
site then is proportional to the level of physical (e.g., motor or foot patrols) or virtual (e.g., 
security cameras) police presence. 
 
The relative effectiveness of a fixed level of police presence can be affected by broadly 
defined environmental factors, of course.  Because conventional police patrolling is less effective 
in darkness, for example, ambient victimization risk i es after dark (Coupe and Blake, 2006).  
Architectural structures  that obscure vision can hve a similar effect but outdoor lighting can 
mitigate the risk (Farrington and Welsh, 2002).  Because rural areas have fewer police resources 
(Thurman and McGarrell, 1997;  Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells, 1999), rational predators may 
view rural adult business sites as more attractive (McCleary, 2008). 
 
In theory, any type of adult business that attracts high-value targets will generate an 
ambient public safety hazard.  The theory allows for qualitative differences nevertheless.  Some 
differences arise from idiosyncratic opportunity struc ures associated with a particular type of 
adult business.   In this instance, for example, th video viewing booths that distinguish on-site 
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and off-site adult bookstores create opportunities for victimless vice crimes (Sundholm, 1973;  
Tewksbury, 1993;  Weatherford, 1986).  To the extent that on-site and off-site adult bookstores 
attract high-value targets from wide catchment areas, both business types are expected to attract 
predators to their neighborhoods, thereby generating mbient victimization risk.  The case study 
data presented here corroborate this theoretical expectation. 
 
DR. JOHN’S: A CASE STUDY 
 
Adult businesses are nothing new to Sioux City, Iowa.  Two adult businesses had 
operated without incident in the city’s older downtown area for decades.  Although both 
businesses sold sexually explicit DVDs for off-site use, most of their revenue came from coin-
operated viewing booths.  Nevertheless, strictly speaking, both belonged to the adult business 
model that Justice Souter characterized as the “commercially natural, if not universal” model.  
(City of Los Angeles 2002). In terms of “look and feel,” the two businesses were 
indistinguishable from adult businesses in larger cities. 
 
In March, 2004, a third adult business, Dr. John’s, opened in Sioux City.  Unlike the two 
existing businesses, Dr. John’s had no viewing booths.  It was located in a newer ar a of the city 
and lacked the garish appearance often associated with adult businesses generally and, in 
particular, with Sioux City’s two existing adult businesses.  During subsequent litigation, the trial 
judge commented on this fact: 
 
[T]he first impression of the store is a far cry from the first image that most 
people would likely have of an “adult book store” or “sex shop.” There is nothing 
seedy about the neighborhood, store building, or store front. In fact, from a quick 
drive-by, one would likely assume that the business wa  a rather upscale retail 
store for women's clothing and accessories. There ar  no “adult” signs or banners 
proclaiming “peep shows,” “live entertainment booths,” “XXX movies,” “live 
models,” “adult massage,” or any of the other tastele s come-ons all too familiar 
from adult entertainment stores that exist in virtually every American city of any 
size and which one may find scattered along interstate  and highways even in 
rural America. (Dr. John’s, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, IA 2005 at 1103). 
 
The trial judge’s drive-by impression may overstate th  point.  Few passers-by would mistake Dr. 
John’s for anything other than what it was. 
 
Regardless of its look and feel Dr. John’s was located in a prohibited zone.  When Sioux 
City attempted to enforce its zoning code, Dr. John’s sued, arguing that off-site adult businesses 
lacked the typical crime-related secondary effects associated with adult businesses.  To counter 
this argument, Sioux City produced police reports of incidents occurring within 500 feet of Dr. 
John’s during the four years between January 1st, 2002 and December 31st, 2005.  For purposes 
of quasi-experimental control, reports of incidents occurring within 500 feet of a nearby motel 
were also retrieved. 
 
Table 1 breaks the incidents down by broad categoris for 793 days before and 668 days 
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after Dr. John’s opened.  In the Dr. John’s circle, the annual crime rate rose from 7.8 to 22.4 
incidents per year, an increase of approximately 190 percent.  Crime in the control circle rose as 
well, from 20.3 to 25.1 incidents per year, a more modest increase of approximately 25 percent.  
Assuming that plausible alternative hypotheses can be ruled out, a crude comparison of rates 
suggests that Dr. John’s poses an ambient victimization risk. 
 
 Table 1- Crime Incidents Before and After the Opening of Dr. John’s  
   Dr. John’s   Control   
   Before After   Before After   
 Property 
Personal 
Other 
 
Total 
 10 
1 
6 
 
17 
20 
3 
18 
 
41 
  21 
8 
15 
 
44 
25 
5 
16 
 
46 
  
 
Null Hypothesis.  The most obvious alternative hypothesis is that t e before/after effect 
is due to chance.  To test this hypothesis, we take advantage of the fact that crime incidents in the 
two circles are not different than Poisson (Haight, 1967: 94-95).  Under a Poisson hypothesis, the 
after/before odds for the Dr. John’s and control circles, reported in Table 2, are distribu ed as 
unit-mean log-Normal variables (Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland, 1975: 315-17).  The ratio of the 
two odds, also distributed as unit-mean log-Normal, is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the 
before/after change.  In this instance, the estimated odds ratio (17/41 x 44/46 ≈ 2.31) implies that 
ambient crime rose by 131 percent after the opening of Dr. John’s.  Since estimates of this size or 
larger occur by chance with probability smaller than 0.01, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
 
 Table 2 - Null Hypothesis Tests 
  Before After    
 Total Incidents N Rate N Rate A:B Odds Ratio p < 
  Dr. John’s 
Control 
17 
44 
 7.8 
20.3 
41 
46 
22.4 
25.1 
2.86 
1.24 
 
2.31 
 
0.01 
  Before After    
 Officer-Initiated Excluded N Rate N Rate A:B Odds Ratio p < 
  Dr. John’s 
Control 
12 
26 
 5.5 
12.0 
31 
32 
16.9 
17.5 
3.08 
1.46 
 
2.11 
 
0.04 
  
 
Internal Validity.  Another set of alternative hypotheses involve uncontrolled threats to 
internal validity.  The quasi-experimental design summarized in Table 1 is a variation of the  
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Campbell and Stanley (1963: 55) “multiple interrupted ime series quasi-experiment.”  It is “the 
best of the more feasible designs,” in their opinion (Campbell and Stanley, 1963:  57; see also, 
Cook and Campbell, 1979: 214-218;  Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002: 206).  All three 
primary authorities cite history, maturation, and instrumentation as plausible threats to internal 
validity.  The control circle contrast makes these thr ats implausible in principle.  If the Dr. 
John’s and control circles have significantly different crime risk factors, however, the quasi-
experimental contrast fails. 
 
Campbell and Stanley (1966, pp. 55-57) analyze the failed quasi-experimental contrast as 
a selection-interaction threat.  Because selection-interaction is defined by the logical conjunction 
of selection and, in this instance, history, maturation, or instrumentation, selection-interaction is 
ruled out by ruling out selection; or by ruling out history, maturation, and instrumentation.  We 
use both arguments to rule out the plausible alterna ive explanations based on uncontrolled 
threats to internal validity. 
 
Selection.  Ambient crime risk factors in the Dr. John’s and control circles seem roughly 
comparable.  Because the two circles are tangent, for example, face the same thoroughfare, and 
have identical pedestrian accesses, their traffic flows are identical.  Because the two circles have 
roughly the same numbers and types of businesses, they have roughly comparable opportunities 
for commercial crime.  The circles are in the same Census blocks, municipal zone, and postal 
(zip) code. 
 
The crime rates in Table 2 suggest one apparent difference, nevertheless.  Over the 793-
day pre-intervention period, the crime rate in the control circle is approximately 2.5 times that of 
the Dr. John’s circle.  Much of this difference is due to the fact that the control circle is centered 
on a motel and that the local police department uses a National Incident Based Reporting  
(NIBRS) coding protocol.9  If the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) “hotel” and “hierarchical” 
coding rules were applied to these data, the difference in crime rates would be reduced by half 
(Rantala and Edwards, 2000; James and Council, 2008).10  Since the NIBRS protocol is used in 
both the pre- and post-intervention segments, of course, its effect is cancelled in the before/after 
ratio.  Otherwise, the control circle appears roughly comparable to the Dr. John’s circle in all 
theoretically relevant respects. 
 
Although a selection-interaction threat cannot be ruled out categorically, it does not seem 
to be wholly plausible.  When plausibility of the conjoined threats of history, maturation, and/or 
instrumentation are considered, moreover, a selection-interaction seem wholly implausible.  We 
begin with the least plausible of the three conjoined threats. 
 
Maturation.  If a times series is a realization of a non-stationary process, any arbitrary  
test of a before/after null hypothesis is biased in favor of rejection.  Since homogeneous Poisson 
processes are stationary (Kingman, 1993: 9-10), the maturation hypothesis can be tested through 
a Poisson goodness-of-fit test.  Since a Kolomogorov-Smirnov test statistic (Kendall and Stuart, 
1979:  476-481) for the daily time series (Z = 0.14) lies within the 95 percent confidence interval 
( p <0.89), the Poisson hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Accordingly, the maturation hypothesis is 
implausible. 
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History.  To assess the threat of history, public records and local media were searched for 
the period of 120 days before and 120 days after the opening of Dr. John’s.  The search turned up 
no potentially disruptive events within 1,500 feet of either site during that period.  History too is 
implausible. 
 
Instrumentation.  Instrumentation threats arise in crime rate time series when an 
intervention affects the manner in which crimes incidents are recorded (McCleary, Erven, and 
Nienstedt, 1982).  If the opening of an adult busine s like Dr. John’s leads to heightened police 
surveillance, for example, the probability of discovering and recording latent incidents may 
rise.11 Whereas this explanation might be plausible for crime incidents discovered by police 
patrols, however, it is implausible for crimes reported to the police by victims or witnesses. 
 
This suggests a straightforward test of the instrumentation hypothesis.  Based on their 
independent reading of crime incident narrative repo ts, graduate research assistants separated 
the incidents into incidents initiated by a complaining victim or witness and incidents initiated by 
patrol officers.  As reported in Table 2, excluding officer-initiated crime incidents leads to the 
same conclusion.  The null hypothesis is rejected with 95 percent confidence, rendering the 
instrumentation hypothesis implausible. 
 
 
  Table 3 - Crime Incidents by Time of Occurrence  
   Dr. John’s   Control   
   Before After   Before After   
 8 PM - 3:59 AM 
4 AM - 7:59 PM 
 
Total 
 3 
14 
 
17 
21 
20 
 
41 
  12 
32 
 
44 
13 
33 
 
46 
  
   Odds Ratio = 4.66;   t-Statistic = 1.88   
 
In addition to hypothesis tests for specific threats to internal validity, the plausibility of 
any alternative hypothesis rests on the coherence of the observed effect (Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell, 2002: 35-36).  Table 3 reports auxiliary data that indirectly corroborate a nominal 
interpretation of the before/after effect.  The befor /after effect is most pronounced during the 
eight-hour overnight shift.  Because 24-hour businesses had operated in both circles without 
interruption since 2002, the abrupt increase in nighttime risk cannot be attributed to the mere 
onset of late-night and early-morning commerce but,rather, must be attributed to the adult nature 
of the new commercial activity. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Readers who are unfamiliar with Poisson time series might be tempted to discount the 
statistical significance levels reported in Tables 1-3.  The statistical significance of a Poisson 
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time series effect is determined not by the number of non-zero observations, however, but by the 
length of the series.  Time series of N=1,461 daily observations are sufficiently long to detect 
effects considerably smaller than those reported. 
 
Although the common threats to internal validity cannot be ruled out categorically, they 
do not seem plausible in light of the available auxiliary data.  Questions of generality remain, of 
course.  That is the nature of case study evidence.  Nevertheless, in light of the strong underlying 
theory and the coherent pattern of effects, it is reasonable to think that the findings apply to off-
site adult businesses generally. 
 
The routine activity theory of hot spots holds that people who carry cash and who are 
reluctant to report crimes are at risk of predation.  Adult business customers are not alone in that 
respect.  Drug dealers (Topalli, Wright and Fornango, 2002) and illegal immigrants (Davis, Erez, 
and Avitabile, 2001) are vulnerable to predation for similar reasons.  When vulnerable targets are 
attracted to a site, their presence attracts predators with predictable consequences: ambient crime 
risk.  Adult business sites are not unique in that respect.  Currency exchanges are notorious hot 
spots because illegal immigrants who cash checks at the site are robbed as they walk home (Barr, 
2004).  Pedestrians in downtown commercial districts do not carry cash and are not reluctant to 
report crimes; and they have relatively low robbery risks (Wright and Decker, 1997). 
 
The coherent pattern of effects reinforces the theory.  The routine activity theory holds 
that crime rates rise and fall across a 24-hour day in response to the diurnal routine activity cycle, 
for example.  Crime rates are lower at night because businesses are closed and people are safely 
asleep in their homes; fewer targets are available for predation.  When targets are at risk around 
the clock, however, the risk is most acute in hours f darkness (Van Koppen and Jansen, 1999; 
Coupe and Blake, 2006).  The corroborating post-intervention diurnal cycle (Table 3) makes the 
straightforward generalization more credible. 
 
In contrast to the relevant criminological theory, the common sense theory of secondary 
effects predicts that off-site adult bookstores pose relatively small ambient public safety hazards.  
This prediction rests on the assumption that an “aver ge” customer drives up to the store, parks, 
runs in, makes a purchase, runs out, and drives off.  Because the “average” customer spends very 
little time in and around the store, the neighborhod will have few (if any) vulnerable targets to 
attract predators.  Absent both targets and predators, c mmon sense argues the crime-related 
secondary effects of off-site adult bookstores willbe smaller than the analogous effects of on-site 
adult businesses. 
 
Although the assumed “average” behavior of off-site adult business customers may be 
consistent with common sense, it is inconsistent with the data.  In an ethnographic study of an 
off-site adult business, Hefley (2007) reports thatpatrons spend significant periods of time in the 
immediate vicinity of the site.  Some wait outside until the business is empty.  Others “case” the 
business on multiple occasions before deciding to en er.  Some patrons park their cars a block or 
more away and walk to the store.  These “average” behaviors attract predators to the site, 
creating the ambient public safety hazard predicted by the routine activity theory. 
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Like the formal scientific theories that they precede, common sense theories evolve in 
light of experience (Popper, 1979: 32-105).  An ambiguous passage in the Encore Videos (2002) 
decision left the impression that the 5th Circuit had endorsed an interpretation of criminological 
theory favoring the plaintiffs.   Four years later, however, in H and A Land Corp. v. City of 
Kennedale (2007), the Court revisited the issue.  In Encore Videos (2002), the 5th Circuit struck 
down portions of a San Antonio ordinance that dealt with off-site adult bookstores because the 
factual predicate of the ordinance included no secondary effects studies of off-site stores.  The 
factual predicate of the ordinance challenged in H and A Land Corp (2007), in contrast, included 
at least two studies of the secondary effects of off-site adult businesses.  The 5th Circuit panel 
upheld the ordinance on that basis: 
 
This case differs from Encore Videos because Kennedale, unlike San Antonio, 
offers evidence that purports to show a connection between purely off-site 
businesses, or “bookstores,” and harmful secondary effects. (H and A Land Corp 
2007 at 339) 
 
The 5th Circuit panel, including one member who had participated in Encore Videos, took the 
unusual step of retracting the ambiguous passage that seemed to endorse an interpretation of 
criminological theory favoring plaintiffs.  This clarification proved prescient.  One week later, a 
customer who had parked several hundred feet away from one of the plaintiff’s off-site stores 
was confronted by an armed robber and seriously wounded (Bourgeois, 2007).  The facts of this 
incident are consistent the data and theory.12 
 
The secondary effects studies relied upon in H and A Land Corp. (2007), as well as the 
case study findings reported here, corroborate the criminological theory of routine activities.  In 
turn, these findings corroborate the findings and experiences of urban planners (Burr, 1998; Ford 
and Beveridge, 2004;  Papayanis, 2000;  Ryder, 2004).  The emerging picture of the problems 
associated adult businesses is convincing.  Governments have the ethical dilemma of balancing 
the mitigation of secondary effects and the First Amendment rights of citizens. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                
1 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 319 (2000), where Justice O’Connor 
stated, “nude dancing still receives First Amendment protection, even if that protection lies only 
in the ‘outer ambit’ of that Amendment.” 
2 See. e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) where zoning to 
control the location of adult businesses is upheld. 
3 “Common sense” (or “fallible realism”) refers to the evolving body of knowledge that is 
open  to non-experts.   Scientific knowledge, which is open only to experts, is preceded by 
common sense.  “[A]ll science, and all philosophy, are enlightened common sense” (Popper, 
1979: 34; see also, Musgrave, 1993).  
4 In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), Justice Souter 
characterizes this model as “commercially natural, if not universal.”  
5 Justice O’Connor's opinion criticized the 9th Circuit for imposing too high a bar for cities 
that seek merely to address the secondary effects of adult businesses. The 9th Circuit found that 
the 1977 study did not provide reasonable support for the 1983 amendment because the study 
focused on the secondary effects associated with a concentration of establishments rather than a 
concentration of operations within a single establishment.  While acknowledging that the city's 
1977 study did not assess whether multiple adult businesses operating under one roof were 
associated with an increase in secondary effects, Justice O’Connor argued that the city could 
infer that a concentration of operations, no less than a concentration of establishments, would be 
associated with an increase in negative secondary effects. She then criticized the 9th Circuit for 
implicitly requiring that the city must not merely provide reasonable support for a theory that 
justifies its ordinance, but also prove that its theory is the only plausible one.  
6 Justice Kennedy contended that this case raised two evidentiary questions for the Court. 
"First, what proposition does a city need to advance i  order to sustain a secondary-effects 
ordinance? Second, how much evidence is required to support the proposition?" Id. at 425.  He 
argued that the plurality answered only the second question, and while he believed that answer 
was correct, in his view more attention needed to be paid to the first. The critical inquiry that 
Justice Kennedy believes the plurality "skips" is "how speech will fare under the city's 
ordinance." In his view, shared by Justice Souter's dis enting opinion, a "city may not assert that 
it will reduce secondary effects by reducing speech in t e same proportion." In short, "[t]he 
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rationale of the ordinance must be that it will suppress secondary-effects-and not by suppressing 
speech." Id. at 450-51  Applying this first step to the ordinance in this case, Justice Kennedy 
argued that it would have one of two effects when applied to an establishment operating two 
adult businesses under one roof: one of the businesses must either move or close. Since the latter 
of these effects cannot lawfully be the rationale for the ordinance – i.e., the city cannot lawfully 
seek to reduce the amount of secondary effects merely be reducing the number of adult 
businesses – the city's rationale must be that affected businesses will relocate rather than close 
and that the resulting dispersion of businesses will reduce secondary effects but not substantially 
diminish the number of businesses. Having identified the city’s “proposition,” Justice Kennedy 
next asked whether the city had presented sufficient evidence to support that proposition. In line 
with the plurality, Justice Kennedy argued for significant deference to local government fact-
finding in making this inquiry. Citing Renton and Young, he contended that cities “must have 
latitude to experiment at least at the outset, and that very little evidence is required.” He also 
cautioned that “[a]s a general matter, courts should not be in the business of second-guessing the 
fact-bound empirical assessments of city planners,” noting: “The Los Angeles City Council 
knows the streets of Los Angeles better than we do. It is entitled to rely on that knowledge; and if 
its inference appears reasonable, we should not say there is no basis for that conclusion.” Here, 
Justice Kennedy found that, for purposes of surviving a motion for summary judgment, the city’s 
proposition is supported by both its 1977 study and “common experience” and that the 1983 
ordinance was reasonably likely to reduce secondary effects substantially while reducing the 
number of adult entertainment businesses very little. Id. at 457. 
7 Justice Souter was concerned about what he viewed as the significant risk that courts will 
approve ordinances that are effectively regulating speech based on government's distaste for the 
viewpoint being expressed. “Adult speech refers not merely to sexually explicit content, but to 
speech reflecting a favorable view of being explicit about sex and a favorable view of the 
practices it depicts; a restriction on adult content is thus also a restriction turning on a particular 
viewpoint, of which the government may disapprove.”  For Justice Souter, the risk of viewpoint 
discrimination may be addressed by imposing on governm nt a requirement that it demonstrate 
empirically “that the effects exist, that they are caused by the expressive activity subject to the 
zoning, and that the zoning can be expected either to ameliorate them or to enhance the capacity 
of the government to combat them (say, by concentrati g them in one area), without suppressing 
the expressive activity itself.”  Justice Souter claimed that his call for empirical evidence does 
not impose a Herculean task on government; rather, t  harms allegedly caused by adult 
establishments "can be shown by police reports, crime statistics, and studies of market value, all 
of which are within a municipality's capacity or available from the distilled experiences of 
comparable communities." Id. He also noted that the need for “independent proof” can vary with 
the proposition that needs to be established and thus “zoning can be supported by common 
experience when there is no reason to question it.” Id. at 458-59. 
8 But see also R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, 361 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2004)(finding it 
unreasonable for city officials to believe that secondary effects were associated with a business 
where dancers performed wearing fully opaque clothing over the public area, buttocks and 
breasts when the city had no evidence of secondary effects associated with such businesses and 
plaintiff’s two experts testified no studies demonstrated adverse secondary effects from such 
businesses; nor did the experts believe such effects could be found). 
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9 The NIBRS coding protocol breaks crime events down into component incidents.  To 
illustrate, under the NIBRS protocol, a robbery-homicide event would be coded as two incidents, 
each with its own characteristics.  Incident-based crime rates are ordinarily higher than event-
based crime rates. 
10 The UCR coding protocol ignores all but the most serious component incident of an 
event.  Under the UCR protocol, a robbery-homicide ev nt would be coded as a homicide.  The 
per capita crime rates reported in the popular media are ordinarily event-based rates. 
11 Paul, Linz, and Shafer (2001: 379) argue that the Los Angeles secondary effects study 
challenged in Alameda Books found more crime in adult business neighborhoods because the 
police “were trying harder to find” crime in those n ighborhoods.  Though not addressing the 
methodological issue, Justice O’Connor criticized the 9th Circuit for requiring the City of Los 
Angeles to rule out alternative explanations of its secondary effects evidence.  Alameda Books 
2000 at 727-728. 
12 Such anecdotes are legitimate secondary effects evidence.  See, e.g., World Wide Video of 
Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Anecdotal 
evidence and reported experience can be as telling as statistical data and can serve as a legitimate 
basis for finding negative secondary effects ...”). 
